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Last year, the artist John Perrault introduced the so-called Museum of Modern Art 
(MOMA) Syndrome on his weblog ‘Artopia’.  He described it as “that sinking feeling of 
disappointment when you see a work of art, which you previously knew only from 
reproductions, in real life”.1 Perrault went on to pose the question to the Facebook 
followers of Artopia whether they were familiar with the syndrome.  One of the group’s 
members, Manon Cleary, answered with an anecdote: ‘Escorting a group of 
undergraduate students through the Phillips Collection in DC, I was very surprised 
when one of my brightest students asked, “are these real paintings?” ’2 
 
A good question indeed. Have we seen a work of art if we only know it from a 
reproduction? Is there really an ‘original’ at all? Trying to answer such questions 
means, to put it philosophically, trying to establish the presence of the work of art. When 
considering both the use and necessity of Organ Musicology, this appears to be a 
central issue. The discussion will of course focus on ‘establishing the presence’ of music, 
‘Orgelkunde’ being a musicological discipline.  
 
Situationality 
Theodor Adorno is one of two philosophers whom I would like to cite by means of 
introduction. In his 1949 publication Philosophie der neuen Musik3, Adorno quotes the 
warning of his friend Eduard Steuermann that we are in danger of forgetting ‘the 
experience of music’.4 This is equally true for the ‘lay’ listener who, as Adorno puts it, 
‘only desires music which babbles on as an incidental accompaniment to his work’, as 
for the expert, whose knowledge is in danger of becoming seasoned pedantry. Adorno: 
“While he can manipulate every piece of counterpoint, he has long since lost sight of 
that counterpoint’s purpose”.5 Adorno’s remedy is that we as listeners focus on the 
‘individual work of art’6 accepting the fact that, in doing so, our knowledge of general 
music theory or music history fails to serve us adequately. He realises that his 
proposition departs drastically from the normal tools used to understand ‘die Sache [i.e. 
‘the matter’], wie sie an und für sich selbst ist’, for it implies much more than analysis, 
commentary and criticism.7 Nevertheless, Adorno dismisses the idea that ‘general, 
tacitly accepted’ conditions can be placed on the compositional process.   
 
While Adorno looks for the presence of a piece of music in the ‘object’, to use the word 
he himself chose, Peter Sloterdijk chooses another point of departure, via a variation of 
Hannah Ahrendt’s question ‘Where are we, when we think?’ Sloterdijk asks: ‘Where 
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are we, when we hear music?’8 His idea is that we hear music before we are even born: 
the heartbeat and the voice of our mothers. As a foetus we anticipate life as a ‘sound 
world’, but once we are born we experience it as a ‘crash world’.  This has the result of 
our ear’s longing to return to the womb. Music thus establishes a link between two 
aspirations: to move towards the world and to escape it. Sloterdijk links this idea with 
two classes of music, one which turns its back on the world and one which embraces 
it.9 An answer to the question of where we are when we hear music is only possible, 
says Sloterdijk, ‘when music as a whole might be traced back to an unmistakeable basic 
experience’. He then formulates a reply to the question of the presence of music:  
‘Musik ist nur im hörenden Subjekt’ (‘Music exists only in the one who listens’). This 
does not mean to say that music itself could be of limited importance, for the reverse is 
also true: ‘Das hörende Subjekt ist nur in der Musik.’10  
 
Adorno and Sloterdijk are, of course, only two of many philosophers who are relevant 
to our thoughts about music. To say that their contributions don’t add up to a single 
musical philosophy, even regarding establishing the presence of music, would be the 
understatement of the century. In fact, all we seem to be able to say for certain is that 
works of art are ‘situational’, to use the rather inelegant but clear neologism introduced 
by management experts Paul Hersey and Ken Blanchard in 1969.11 When a work of art 
is present, this postulates a situation in which the work may be named present. To 
elaborate on Adorno, we know that the music in such a situation plays an important 
role and, to elaborate on Sloterdijk, we know that the listener also plays an essential 
part.    
 
Reality seems to confirm the idea that works of art are situational. Strictly speaking, art 
works like this: someone invites somebody else by saying ‘listen to this’. Or ‘look at 
this’. You listen, you look. Your senses are open, in the case of music not just your ears, 
in the case of visual art not just your eyes. Inevitably, art establishes itself differently 
on each occasion: we cannot step in the same river twice, to cite Heraclites.  
 
Reality also allows us to see that, as soon as the experiencing of music becomes a group 
activity, the various power relationships at play become strongly influenced by other 
aspects. These include social aspects, especially evident in the conversation which 
follows the music, in the foyer, in the newspaper or on the radio. The main theme of 
this conversation is judgement. What have we experienced, what did we think of it, 
how do our opinions relate to each other’s? Following judgement one can expect 
correction. This third phase is the domain of a special sort of listener: the musician. 
Correction is not only to be expected in the context of the work’s next performance 
but also in its recordings. This is especially true with today’s advances in technology; 
its seductive powers prove impossible to resist. Just as magazines like to publish 
‘photoshopped’ pictures, and just as Facebook consists of carefully constructed and 
carefully guarded profiles, so recorded music presents a corrected world. The 
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consequence is a variant of the Droste effect: think of the story of the world famous 
organist crushed by nerves before his concerts because he believes that his concerts 
must sound as perfect and accurate as his CDs and, therefore, his CDs just as perfect 
and accurate as his concerts. A truly vicious circle. 
 
Experience, judge, correct. Thereafter study again in order to facilitate the next 
experience. Our musical life seems to be driven by a four-stroke engine. This apparatus 
is provided by fuel from various sources.  
The first source is that the  MOMA syndrome cannot be applied to music. While, in 
the context of visual art, we can reach out and, in theory, physically grasp the ‘thing’, 
whether a painting or a sculpture, with music this is impossible.  
We have, therefore, no option but to accept, time after time, that we have not really 
encountered the ‘true’ work of art at all, even if we thought we had. This reminds of a 
lecture given by conductor Sergiu Celibidache in Munich in 1985.12 Celibidache stated 
that only one Fifth Symphony of Beethoven truly exists and that as a conductor one is 
obliged to go in search of it via trial and error: not like that, not like that and also not 
like that. A frustrating position to take, for even Celibidache would not have been able 
to repeat his ideal performance of Beethoven ‘5’, had he succeeded in discovering it, 
and was thus doomed to exclaim ‘not like that!’ for the rest of his days.  
A second source of fuel for the endlessly active four-stroke motor of our musical culture 
is the importance placed on ‘informed performance’ by significant groups of 
professional musicians; the idea that one can achieve a more or less ideal performance 
on the basis of knowledge of the composer, score, instrument, style, attitude etc. Much 
has been published about this concept for which Stan Godlovitch coined the term the 
‘subordination view’.13 According to him, musicians who subscribe to this perspective, 
over-estimate the status of ‘fixed works’ and under-estimate the degree of 
‘underdetermined’ (as Godlovitch articulates it) elements in scores. Peter Kivy’s critical 
texts about authenticity are, in this context, equally relevant. Kivy differentiates 
between four notions of authenticity: ‘faithfulness to the composer’s performing 
intentions; faithfulness to the performance practice of the composer’s lifetime; 
faithfulness to the sound of a performance during the composer’s lifetime; and 
faithfulness to the performer’s own self.’ The first three varieties of authenticity are 
described by Kivy as examples of ‘historic authenticity’. Especially interesting for us, 
however, is the fourth type of authenticity which, nevertheless, can be nuanced and 
related to the first three types by, for example, recognising that the authenticity of the 
musician is related to the authenticity of his instrument.14  
Godlovitch and Kivy were not the first to question the tendency, especially common 
in the early music sector, to set historic knowledge as a condition for convincing 
music-making. John Cage stated as early as 1955 that ‘no knowing action is 
commensurate, since the character of the knowledge acted upon prohibits all but some 
eventualities.’ And: ‘An experimental action [by which Cage means music-making] does 
not move in terms of approximations and errors as “informed” action, by its nature, 
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must, for no mental images of what would happen were set up beforehand”.15 
Characteristic for this ‘informed’ action is a reliance on what I would like to call 
‘circumstantial evidence’, as the ‘evidence’ refers in fact mainly to knowledge ‘round’ 
the music rather than knowledge of what is presented on the stage in a concrete 
situation. The risk of Adorno’s ‘seasoned pedantry’ is here great, for this is a type of 
knowledge which can stop attentive and open listening.   
A third, closely related, source of fuel is that constant judgement and correction may 
lead to ‘closed morals’, as Henri Bergson expressed it, a system geared to the 
preservation of social traditions.16 Peer-group pressure is an important influence on the 
‘game of correction’ played by both musicians and listeners whether in the context of 
Celibidache’s striving for the ‘correct’ interpretation or the discussions surrounding  
‘informed performance practices’.  
 
Bearing the ideas of Adorno and Sloterdijk in mind and augmenting them with our 
brief contact with the ideas of Celibidache, Cage and Bergson, it would seem highly 
advisable to re-double our efforts “to put the music back into musicology”, as Nicholas 
Cook put it in 1999.17 In other words, and to recycle our metaphor: perhaps we could 
try to let our musical four-stroke motor run a little smoother. The ‘judgement’ stage in 
particular could benefit from being ‘lubricated’ and, logically, the correction stage as 
well.   
 
New Musicology 
The background to Cook’s plea was the emergence of ‘New Musicology’ since the 
1980s. Within this movement, special attention was paid to musical experience, a 
tendency which gained a significant foothold. It is especially fortuitous to be able to 
illustrate the situation today by mentioning a number of present Dutch examples. 
Sander van Maas’ inaugural speech at the University of Utrecht in 2009, for example, 
was entitled What is a Listener?18 It referred, among other things, to Elmer Schönberger’s 
concept of ‘Het Grote Luisteren’ (i.e. ‘Grand Listening’).19 Another example is the work 
of Henkjan Honing, whose inaugural speech at the University of Amsterdam in 2010 
was entitled De ongeletterde luisteraar (literally translated: ‘The illiterate Listener’).20 
Vincent Meelberg, of the Radboud University in Nijmegen, states in his 2010 book 
Kernthema’s in het muziekonderzoek (‘Key themes in musical research’) that, as far as he is 
concerned, the ‘listening experience’ is the central theme in musical research.21 
Another project, in which music’s situationality is problematised as a whole (i.e. 
addressing many more factors than just the listener’s role therein) is the research into 
‘The Field of Musical Improvisation’, a concept of Marcel Cobussen, teacher and 
researcher at the ‘Academie der Kunsten van de Universiteit Leiden’ and at ‘docARTES’, 
a doctoral programme in the arts.22  
That these forms of musicology require a much broader and, of course, inter-
disciplinary domain than ‘traditional musicology’ is, understandably, also discernible 
in the international literature. In his 2010 book Entangled, Chris Salter draws 
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interesting parallels between performance practice and philosophical, scientific and 
sociological research.23 As far as this last form of research is concerned, Salter cites Lucy 
Suchman, who, in 1987, coined the phrase ‘situated action’. She proposed that the 
coherence of a situated action is tied in essential ways not to individual predispositions 
or conventional rules but to local interactions contingent on the actor’s particular 
circumstances’.24 
Also of interest in this context is the phenomenology of Bruce Ellis Benson who assigns 
improvisation a central function in Western music. In his book, The Improvisation of 
Musical Dialogue, published in 2003, Benson tries to find an alternative to the idea 
which, according to him, is broadly accepted within classical music and its associated 
theory, of ‘Werktreue’ (faithfulness to the original) and the related concept of the 
composer as the ultimate creator. Benson refers to Stan Godlovitch and concurs with 
Gadamer, who sees music as a dialogue with a ‘logical structure of openness’. He comes 
to the conclusion that improvisation is an element of all forms of music-making: 
according to Benson, no-one can claim to be the ‘owner’ of the music, neither the 
composer, nor the musician, nor the listener. They are all partners in an extraordinary 
game – the making of music – which he describes as an improvisatory process. 
Improvisation can be seen in this context as the DNA which binds the various actors 
in a musical situation together and lends the situation its unique character.25  
 
Installation Art 
Dear Listeners: Organ Musicology is, more than any other musicological discipline, 
driven by the situationality of music-making. If there is one form of music which is 
explicitly situational, certainly within our Western culture, then it is organ music. 
Organ Musicology offers us, therefore, a promising platform for contributions towards 
research into music’s situationality.  
 
That’s the second part of my lecture today. I would like to begin by quoting 
philosopher Bert van der Schoot26, who, during one of his visits to the Orgelpark here 
in Amsterdam summed it up succinctly by noting that organ music is, in fact, 
installation art: art, which is designed for a specific room and which, after the 
exhibition is finished, can never exist again in the same way.  
The point here is that every organ is different from every other organ. This obliges the 
organist to constantly revise and adapt the music to the specific situation. Should an 
organist find a successful way of performing a Preludium by Bach on the famous organ 
in Haarlem and should he assume that an identical approach, even if it were possible, 
should work on the beautiful organ in Kampen, he would certainly be sorely 
disappointed: the Preludium will always sound differently in Kampen. This is true even 
though the instruments in question were built within five years of each other and 
both date from Bach’s lifetime. I do not mean to infer here that pianists or violinists are 
not capable of recognising a specific instrument from a collection of thousands of 
others, or even not respecting the individuality of an instrument, but simply that the 
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blueprints of the violin or piano are more uniform than that of the organ. A composer 
of piano music can, therefore, prescribe more precise instructions for what the pianist 
must do than a composer for the organ. Should the latter compose for a specific 
instrument, he either restricts the performer to the organ he himself has in mind or 
must accept the unavoidable loss of artistic control as soon as the score finds itself on 
the music desk of another organ.  
It is important to consider that organists during the mid 19th century, uniquely among 
musicians, did not stop practicing the art of making music without a score. This was 
undoubtedly the result of the necessity of filling silent moments of unpredictable 
duration during the liturgy with music. Organists also realised, however, that organs 
sounded most convincing when their best features were highlighted and their 
weaknesses avoided. Improvisation was, of course, the most effective way to achieve 
this. 
 
It is interesting to consider the way in which the position of the musician appears to 
be situated rather close to the centre of the listener’s attention from this perspective 
on musical situationality. 
To illustrate this, I would like to present a sketch of the organist playing Bach in 
Haarlem. Bach’s intentions in this sketch are seen as a spotlight and his score as a 
round shape; a shape which focuses the beam of the spotlight in such a way that a 
circle of light appears on the flat surface behind.  This circle represents all possible 
performances of the score. The organist chooses his position in this domain through 
knowledge of the composer on the one hand, his ideas, the style of his time etc and, 
on the other, knowledge of the instrument on which he shall perform the music. In 
this manner the organist finds a route through the beam of light between the ideas of 
the composer and the score on the one side and, by extension, between the score and 
the performance domain on the other. The link which then becomes apparent 
between the intention of the composer and the performance itself invalidates the 
Platonic idea of a ‘correct’ performance, whether inspired by Celibidache, informed 
performance practice and/or peer group pressure: many performances are possible, and 
this is precisely what we encounter in reality.  
An enlarged version of this model demonstrates that recordings can function as scores. 
Listening to Bach in Haarlem on your iPod in the train can render the music, to give 
just one example, akin to a sort of film score. As soon as the organist preserves his 
chosen position in the performance domain through the medium of a recording, this 
position will re-appear later on, namely when the recording is listened to. At that 
moment, the position on the performance domain chosen by the organist and 
corrected by the recording engineer functions as a new intention, comparable with the 
intention of the composer when he composed the score. As a result, the recording now 
functions as ‘score 2.0’: the recording has become a shape which, in turn, restricts the 
boundaries of the domain in which the music now appears, since the recording now 
not only identifies the music as the music of Bach but also as a specific performance of 
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it. The responsibility of establishing a position in the performance domain has shifted 
once again: having already moved from the composer to the musician, the creation of 
‘Performance Domain 2.0’ has put the listener in charge, for example through his 
choice of equipment and through all kinds of other peripheral circumstances.  
A Sloterdijk-like phrase seems appropriate here: we have discovered a powerful ‘immune 
system’27 against the frustrations of the MOMA syndrome. The answer to the question 
‘is this real?’ changes from a constant ‘no’, as we saw in the case of Celibidache, to a 
constant ‘yes’. As a consequence neither the intention of the composer, nor that of 
the musician, can be seen as the ‘ideal’ point of reference when judging or correcting. 
The ideal reference point has become the perception of the listener who has literally 
witnessed the musical situation.  
 
Organ Musicology 
To summarise:  Nicholas Cook’s desire to ‘put music back in musicology’ is relevant 
both to music and musicology but simplifies the practice of neither. Organ musicology 
is exceptionally well geared to help, however. Just as the organ obliges organists 
constantly to reflect on how their music sounds in different environments, Organ 
Musicology also obliges musicologists to take each individual situation in which music 
is made as the starting point for their musicological research. Organ Musicology also 
has an inherently practical advantage: research into organ music is relatively simple 
because of the single instrument and musician involved.  
 
It will be of no surprise to learn that research into listening will play an important role 
here at the VU University. In 1940, Adorno carried out comparable research at 
Princeton University. However, where Adorno saw a problem in the variety of 
contrasting reactions from a group of listeners to a particular musical situation, this 
could also be seen in the context of a ‘situation’; a factor which is recognised and 
considered a self-evident and even essential element of the experience. Adorno’s 
problem was the result of his focusing primarily on the object (the music). As a result, 
his position underestimated the importance of other aspects.28  
Within the context of the Orgelpark Research Programme, launched in 2008 and now 
closely linked to the study of Organ Musicology here at the VU, the necessary 
preparations to facilitate research into listening have now been made. For example, 
within the Improvisation Project, the concept of Real Time Analysis has been 
investigated and, following considerable discussion, re-Christened as ‘Witnessing Music 
in Real Time’. During a number of intensive sessions conducted in co-operation with 
the ‘Forschungstelle Basel für Improvisation’ and the ‘Academie der Kunsten’ in Leiden, 
the parameters have been established for evaluating how music is experienced and 
perceived, at the moment of its performance, both by listener and musician.  The 
intention is to develop research via a number of different routes: through discussions 
with the public at live concerts;29 through investigations of the discussions which take 
place ‘after the music’; through research into recordings. Yet another line of 
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investigation will involve discussions with organ voicers and advisors: when do they 
believe that the stationary sound is convincing and why? At this point, Organ 
Musicology will come into contact with Sonic Studies, a new discipline focusing on 
sound rather than on music.   
 
Closely related to this form of Witnessing Music in Real Time is a second point of 
departure within the Improvisation Project, namely the problematising of the concept 
‘improvisation’.  When the musician does not use a score, neither do the (other) 
listeners, so no-one involved is bound to a score’s references to previous performances 
and recordings. In this context, improvisatory music-making means, in fact, 
‘improvisatory listening’.  
This implies, among other things of course, that our use of the concept of 
improvisation in fact tends to colonise the musical heritage of our past. When Bach 
and Buxtehude played the organ, they normally did so without a score. The way in 
which they made music contrast, therefore, with those who improvise at the organ 
today. In this way, the history of organ music (just as the history of organbuilding) 
reflects the development of music and music-making in the West in general, as well as 
how the situationality of music functioned differently in other times. This line of 
enquiry is one of the reasons that the Orgelpark will next year install the 
reconstruction of the organ built for the Klaaskerk in Utrecht in 1479.30 The project is 
an initiative of the Dutch National Heritage Service (‘Rijksdienst voor het Cultureel 
Erfgoed’). Which historic musical situations are connected to this organ and what can 
it teach us about music-making on it today? The research into heritage and into 
‘Improvisational Musicking’ will go hand in hand with, but will not by any means be 
limited to, research into listening.  
In parallel with these research activities, a number of doctoral dissertations are already 
underway. Understanding music as a situational phenomenon and applying this to 
organ music means for them, among other things, affording considerable attention to 
combinations of organ and music which are not self-evidently ideal, such as Bach on 
the Couperin organ behind me31 so well played by University organist Henk Verhoef a 
moment ago. One of the doctoral candidates, for example, is researching the 
remarkable organ music culture in the ‘Re-Reformed’ (orthodox Protestant) 
denominations in the early 20th century. What was music-making like in the time of 
Abraham Kuyper, how did it relate to its surrounding culture and what were the key 
musical situations?  The study of scores and literature are important parts of this 
research, although less important than research into old recordings.  
 
Epilogue 
In a word: it seems quite useful to consider music as installation art, to apply this 
consideration within the context of research into organ music, and, by doing so, to 
articulate the situationality of music in general as an important theme within 
Musicology in general, whether new or not.33 
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I would like to conclude by expressing my gratitude. Firstly to the University’s Board 
who realised immediately after the sudden death of my predecessor Ewald Kooiman in 
January 2009 that the Professorship of Organ Musicology should be continued.  
Thanks also to the Board of the Orgelpark Foundation and its Chairman Loek Dijkman, 
whose support ensured that the Professorship could indeed be re-established.  In 
addition, I would like to thank Dean Douwe Yntema of the Faculty of Letters as well as 
Ginette Verstraete and Wouter Davidts of the Department of General Cultural Research 
for their considerable and stimulating interest. I look forward to working with them 
and with other colleagues, like, to name just one here, Timo de Rijk, Professor of Design 
Cultures, since organs are, in the end, not just musical instruments but highly designed 
custom-made products as well. 
The greeting extended to this initiative by the musicological working groups at the 
Universities of Amsterdam and Utrecht was also heart-warming and I would especially 
like to thank Rokus de Groot, Henkjan Honing, Sander van Maas, Emile Wennekes, 
Karl Kügle, Jaap den Hertog and, of course, Bert van der Schoot. Co-operation has also 
been established between a pleasing number of universities at which organ music and 
related research is taken seriously. Valued colleagues in this respect include  Joris Verdin 
of the Catholic University in Leuven, Jan Luth of the Rijksuniversiteit in Groningen, 
Peter Peters at the University of Maastricht, Vincent Meelberg of the Radboud 
University in Nijmegen, Albert Clement at the Roosevelt Academy in Middelburg and 
Marcel Cobussen of the Academie der Kunsten (Arts Academy) at the Rijksuniversiteit 
in Leiden. Marcel’s interest and friendship were of great significance during the 
thought processes about what the Chair of Organ Musicology can and should achieve.   
I would like to thank my colleagues at the Orgelpark as well: without artistic director 
Johan Luijmes and facility manager Sonja Duimel it wouldn’t be possible to make the 
connection between Organ Musicology at the VU University and the Orgelpark 
Research Program work. 
At the same time I feel somewhat lonely. My own doctoral advisor Ewald Kooiman has 
passed away as has my co-advisor Hermann Busch, just six months ago. Hermann 
Busch was, in Germany, the ‘Autorität’ in the area of organ-related research. From 1987 
onwards, when Ewald was promoted to the position of Professor of Organ Musicology, 
Busch was an outspoken supporter of Ewald’s activities here at the VU University. 
Finally I would like to pay special thanks to Mirjam Kooiman, her mother Truus and 
her brother Peter, who have entrusted me with their father’s doctoral robes. Thank 
you for this deeply touching gesture. It is for me an honour to be able to continue 
Ewald’s work.  
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Notes 
 
1 John Perrault introduced  ‘MoMA Syndrome’ on his weblog in a text published on 17 May, 2010 under the 
heading ‘The Moma Syndrome’. A quote: ‘There is also something I will call the MoMA Syndrome: some first-
time visitors to MoMA, wherever they are from, swoon and faint because the art they see does not live up to 
the perfection of full-color reproductions and slide presentations they have already viewed. That Pollock or 
Picasso is too small. That Barnett Newman is too messy. The ceilings are too low, and there are far too many 
people crowding in front of each painting. Is that really how a Monet looks?’ This initial text can be found 
here: http://www.artsjournal.com/artopia/2010/05/yves_klein_online_plus_the_mom.html. In the 
introduction to the discussion which followed, Perrault wrote the following under the heading ‘Fasten Your 
Seat Belts: The MoMA Syndrome Writ Large’, published on 14 June, 2010: ‘The MoMA Syndrome is defined 
by that sinking feeling of disappointment when victims see artworks previously known only  through color 
reproductions or projections in a lecture hall.’ And ‘I called it the MoMA Syndrome because it sounds catchy 
and, after all, MoMA has the world’s biggest cache of modern-art masterpieces, which are, for better or worse, 
endlessly reproduced.’ http://www.artsjournal.com/mt4/mt-search.cgi?search=moma&IncludeBlogs=16. 
2  The original text: ‘And finally escorting a group of undergraduate students through the Phillips Collection in 
DC, I was very surprised when one of my brightest students asked, “are these real paintings?”. She thought 
they were posters. Well John, what are real paintings?’ The complete discussion can be read here: 
http://johnperreaultstheartopian.blogspot.com/2010_08_01_archive.html. Manon Cleary is an artist who 
lives and works in Washington DC. See also (among others): http://thenewgay.net/2008/03/artist-profile-
manon-cleary.html. 
3 Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophie der neuen Musik, Gesammelten Schriften XII; as it appeared in the ‘text- und 
seitenidentische’ publication by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt, 1978. The book was published in 1949 and was 
Adorno’s first after the war. It was written between 1940 and 1948 during the author’s stay in the United 
States.  From here on I will refer to this text simply as ‘Adorno’. 
4 Adorno, 30. Original text: ‘Stichthaltig ist der Verdacht, den Steuermann einmal äußerte, daß der Begriff der 
großen Musik, der heute an die Radikale übergegangen ist, selber nur einem Augenblick der Geschichte 
angehöre; daß die Menschheit im Zeitalter der allgegenwärtigen Radios und Grammophonautomaten die 
Erfahrung von Musik überhaupt vergesse.’ Adorno studied briefly with Steuermann in 1924. Steuermann was 
a pianist and composer; in 1957 he was one of the teachers at the ‘Ferienkurse für neue Musik’ in Darmstadt. 
5 Adorno, 30-31, footnote 13. Adorno mentions here Hegel, an important figure in general in his Philosophie der 
neuen Musik, who in his ‘Musikästhetik’ contrasts ‘Dilettanten und Kenner’. According to Adorno, Hegel views 
the ‘Notwendigkeit der Divergenz beider Typen’ as, ‘die eben aus der Arbeitsteilung folgt’. For ‘Kunst ist zum 
Erben hochspezialisierter handwerklicher Verfahren geworden, als das Handwerk selber durch 
Massenproduktion abgelöst war.’ He goes on: ‘Damit hat aber der Kenner [...] auch sich selber zur Unwahrheit 
entfaltet, komplementär zu der der Laien, welcher von der Musik nur noch erwartet, daß sie neben seinem 
Arbeitstag hinplätschere. Er [de kenner] ist zum Experten geworden, sein Wissen, das einzige, das die Sache 
überhaupt noch erreicht, zugleich zum routiniertes Bescheidwissen, das sie tötet. Er vereint zünftlerische 
Toleranz mit sturer Naivetät in allem, was über Technik als Selbstzweck hinausgeht. Während er jeden 
Kontrapunkt kontrollieren kann, übersieht er längst nicht mehr, wozu das Ganze und ob es überhaupt noch 
gut sei: die spezialisierte Nähe schlägt in Verblendung, Erkenntnis in gleichsam administrativen 
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